The Unacceptable Risk of Executing an Innocent Person

In justifying the execution of Troy Davis, Charles Lane (“Doubts about his guilt? Not reasonable ones,” Star Tribune, 9/23/11) off-handedly remarks that “limiting the death penalty more strictly to the ‘worst of the worst’ would shrink the risk of executing an innocent man.” But by acknowledging the existence of a risk—however remote—that innocent people may be executed in the United States, Mr. Lane underscores both the need for vigilance in our justice system and the fundamental problem that the risk of executing innocents poses for the death penalty.

Indeed, following conviction, nearly 140 people on death row have been exonerated to date. It is unacceptable to risk the lives of so many, placing them so close to execution, and to take from them all the years they spent incarcerated on death row. Even more unacceptable are the executions of those who may not have been exonerated in time—people like Carlos De Luna, Larry Griffin, Ruben Cantu, and Cameron Todd Willingham.

Mr. Willingham, for example, was killed on February 17, 2004 by the State of Texas via lethal injection following his conviction for murder by arson of his three children. Throughout the trial proceedings and through his execution, Mr. Willingham maintained his innocence, and investigation subsequent to his conviction supported his claim. Multiple experts reviewed evidence and documentation of the fire and found substantial flaws in the initial investigation, suggesting that the fire might have actually been an accident. Moreover, an independent, peer-reviewed panel of arson experts concluded that each and every forensic interpretation made by the prosecution’s experts at Mr. Willingham’s trial was scientifically invalid. Nevertheless, such analysis did not prevent Mr. Willingham’s execution. Nor can it bring him back now that he is gone.

Despite the grim lesson learned at Mr. Willingham’s expense, Mr. Lane is apparently comfortable assuring readers that there were no reasonable doubts as to Mr. Davis’ guilt and that the risk of executing an innocent man “did not materialize in the Troy Davis case.” Given the irrevocable nature of ending a person’s life, it would appear obvious that any risk of executing an innocent person is too great a risk. And—reasonable doubt notwithstanding—it is fundamental that no amount of “shrinking” will make that risk acceptable.