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The ruling party aimed to have full control over the CSOs in Georgia, which would automatically silence our voices. The law would serveas an oppressive mechanism that restricts citizens' rights to exercise their fundamental civil and political rights.[1] In response to this law, the CSO community ed active preparations. Almost instinctively, CSOs and civil activists divided tasks, coordinated our messaging, and launched a powerful, unified response. 

Looking back, ourinitial strategy was successful because it was centered on inclusivity and communication. We quickly realizedthat if we wanted to be effective, we knew we could not just talk amongstourselves; we would need to engage with other stakeholders. So, we engaged with teachers, students, entrepreneurs, and people in rural areas whose livelihoods depended on international funding. Ourobjective with these meetings, whetherconducted in-person or virtually, wastodisseminate informationregarding the imminent threat posed by the law and to listen to the concerns of stakeholders about how the law might affect their lives and work.  

The media played a pivotal role in opposing the 'Russian Law,' as various media outlets provided a platform for individuals from diverse fields-scientists, students, advocates, psychologists, activists, and others-to communicate how the adoption of the law would not only impact usindividually but also disproportionately affect the most vulnerable groups, including children, people with disabilities, the elderly, and other marginalized communities. It was not difficult to persuade the people of Georgia that the law would worsen the situation for everyone, as this claim was grounded in truth. People believed us at the time, and now they arewitnessing firsthand the negative consequences the adoption of this law has brought to the country. 

Additionally, another crucial dimension involved informing international organizations, embassies, media, and other relevant actors about the proposed law. 

Once our efforts reached civil society, they sparked widespread public outrage. People swiftly began protesting the law, and ultimately, we succeeded in securing the withdrawal of the draft law. While this was a significant victory, our success proved to be short-lived.  

We trusted the promises made by the ruling party that they would never reintroduce the foreign influence law. However, a year later, in 2024, the government cleverly reintroduced the law, rebranding it as the 'Foreign Influence Transparency' law. This time, it seemed that they were well-prepared, with clear messaging and a campaign aimed at convincing people that the law was merely a copy of the United States' Foreign Agents Registration Act (US FARA), not Russia's, and that it was solely about transparency. [2] 

At a certain point, it is important to engage in self-reflection, as we placed our trust in the ruling party, lost focus, and reduced our efforts in opposition to the Russian Law. Shortly thereafter, they reintroduced the law, and we were left with little time to respond. However, it is equally crucial to emphasize that, regardless of our actions, the ruling party had a clear intention to pass this law at any cost, and they proceeded with its adoption. Members of Parliament from the ruling party entered the parliamentary building under the protection of special police forces, while peaceful demonstrators gathered outside to protest the law. The parliamentary committee approved the draft law in a mere 67 seconds. Despite public protests, critical statements from the European Commission [3], and the urgent opinion from the Venice Commission [4], the law was adopted. According to the law, NGOs and independent media receiving more than 20% of their funding from foreign donors are required to register as organizations "bearing the interests of a foreign power." 

While we were focused on combating the Foreign Agent Law and its consequences, the government quietly pushed through other controversial measures: creating schemes to rig elections, adopting the so-called 'Offshore Law' [5], which eased financial regulations for the main oligarch in Georgia, and passing the 'Family Values' law, which imposed censorship on the media by banning broadcasters from freely reporting on LGBTQ+ issues. [6] Later, all these actions culminated in a rigged election and the halting of Georgia's bid for European integration. [7] 

If there is a central lesson to be drawn from our experience with the Foreign Agent Law, it is the critical importance of vigilance. We cannot afford to place undue trust in empty promises, and we must remain consistently prepared. While broad public engagement is both significant and beneficial, it is equally important to maintain awareness of the broader political context and acknowledge the potential for manipulation. I share our story as a cautionary tale, as I believe that any country could employ such tactics to advance unpopular policies. It is crucial to learn from the experiences of others and to remain adaptable and responsive to these challenges. 

For us in Georgia, the fight is not over. We are still protesting, still demanding our rights. We are learning, adapting, and preparing for whatever comes next. 

by Ana Tavxelidze

[1] Jacqueline Van De Velde, “The Foreign Agent Problem: An International Legal Solution to Domestic Restrictions on Non-Governmental Organizations,” Cardozo Law Review 40, no. 2 (2019 2018): 687–748.
[2] Note: For a comparison between the Georgian 'Foreign Influence Transparency' Law and U.S. FARA, see the urgent opinion of the Venice Commission, 24 June, 2024 §§38-41; available at: https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2024)020-e 
[3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_24_2945
[4] https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2024)020-e
[5] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/its-foreign-agent-bill-caused-an-uproar-now-georgian-dream-has-fast-tracked-another-concerning-law/
[6] https://www.article19.org/resources/georgia-family-values-bill-imposes-censorship-on-media/
[7] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/statement-high-representative-vice-president-commission-kaja-kallas-and-commissioner-enlargement-2024-12-01_en