

Alfred Zeon

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TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF LIBERIA  
DIASPORA PROJECT

PUBLIC HEARING  
HAMLINE UNIVERSITY  
June 12, 2008  
St. Paul, Minnesota

TESTIMONY OF  
ALFRED ZEON

TRC Commissioners:

Chairman Jerome Verdier  
Vice Chairperson Dede Dolopei  
Oumu Syllah  
Sheikh Kafumba Konneh  
Pearl Brown Bull  
Rev. Gerald Coleman  
John H.T. Stewart  
Massa Washington

Court Reporter:

Elizabeth Gangl  
Registered Professional Reporter

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1 The following proceedings were had and made of

2 Alfred Zeon  
record, commencing at approximately 11:31.

3 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Please stand for the  
4 oath.

5 ALFRED ZEON,  
6 being first duly sworn to tell the truth, testified as  
7 follows:

8 TESTIMONY OF ALFRED ZEON

9 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Mr. Witness, good  
10 afternoon and welcome.

11 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

12 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: I want to say how  
13 pleased we are that you have come as a Liberian --

14 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

15 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: -- to share your  
16 experiences and make your contribution to our search for  
17 lasting peace, healing and reconciliation.

18 THE WITNESS: Okay.

19 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Having said that, I want  
20 to introduce the commissioners to you, following which you  
21 will see that you will there by yourself and you can proceed  
22 with your testimony.

23 THE WITNESS: Sure.

24 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Commissioner Sheikh  
25 Kafumba Konneh is at the end on my left. Commissioner Pearl

3

1 Brown Bull. Commissioner Gerald Coleman. Commissioner Dede  
2 Dolopei. Massa Washington. And Commissioner John Stewart.  
3 I am Jerome Verdier.

4 THE WITNESS: Okay.

5 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: I would like to ask just

6 Alfred Zeon  
a few questions. Firstly, can you restate your name, please?  
7 THE WITNESS: Yes. I'm Alfred K. Zeon.  
8 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Alfred K. Zeon.  
9 THE WITNESS: Yep.  
10 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Where do you live,  
11 please? Reside?  
12 THE WITNESS: Presently?  
13 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Yeah.  
14 THE WITNESS: I live here in Minnesota, Brooklyn  
15 Park.  
16 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Your date of birth,  
17 please?  
18 THE WITNESS: July 15, 1958.  
19 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: July 15, 19?  
20 THE WITNESS: '58.  
21 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Thank you, sir. Your  
22 vocation? What do you do?  
23 THE WITNESS: Right now I'm on the medical field.  
24 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: You --  
25 THE WITNESS: I, I help, I give home aid.

4

1 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Home aid, medical  
2 assistance, right. Can you tell us when you migrated to the  
3 U.S.?  
4 THE WITNESS: 2002, August 9.  
5 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Okay, thank you very  
6 much. Before, I would like to just introduce Commissioner  
7 Oumu Syllah --  
8 THE WITNESS: Excuse me. Did I say 2000 or 2002?  
9 COMMISSIONER KONNEH: 2002.

10 Alfred Zeon  
THE WITNESS: 2000. I'm sorry.

11 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Commissioner Oumu Syllah  
12 is at the end, the extreme of my right.

13 THE WITNESS: Nice meeting you.

14 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: You may proceed now.  
15 Please.

16 THE WITNESS: Okay. Before I proceed, I want to  
17 ask a question, one question before I proceed. I'm here to  
18 testify, you know, concerning the Liberian war, so what I  
19 want for you, what I want to understand is, is this testimony  
20 is from 1970 -- I mean 1989 to 1990? Or is this from, you  
21 know, whatsoever, like 1847 or so?

22 (Laughter.)

23 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: We'll be happy if you  
24 can restrict yourself to the statement you gave to our --

25 THE WITNESS: Oh, okay.

5

1 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: -- yes, some time back.

2 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

3 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: If during question and  
4 answer you want to reflect on the past --

5 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

6 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: -- and say anything of  
7 that nature, yeah, then you can do it.

8 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

9 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Okay.

10 THE WITNESS: Well, I'm, as I said before, I'm  
11 Alfred Zeon. I started working for the Liberian government  
12 in 1981 as cadet at the executive mansion. I worked for SSS.  
13 And when I graduated in 1982, I was sent for intensive

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14 training. And when I graduated from my training, I was then  
15 promoted to, you know, agent for Special Security Service.  
16 So I know that how I, you know, I'm a former employee of the  
17 Liberian government, you know.

18 what I want to say here is Taylor, as you all know,  
19 when Doe took over, Taylor, he appointed Taylor as GSA, you  
20 know, director, and Taylor took money and came to this  
21 country. He embezzled money and he came to this country.  
22 But later we heard that Taylor was, I mean Taylor break jail.  
23 And when Taylor went back, I mean when Taylor left from here,  
24 he went to Libya before going to Berkina Faso. We heard,  
25 we're at the mansion, and I'm a Special Security personnel,

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1 we heard that Taylor was training, okay, and there was a  
2 troop dispatched to Ivory Coast to find out whether it is  
3 true. The people went there, they came back, and they say,  
4 yeah, it was true, that people were training.

5 But the Liberian people, when Doe took over, Doe is a  
6 man, I know he just say that, you know, when anything happen,  
7 he will overcome this. So when we heard that this is true,  
8 that people were training, the information reached Doe, but  
9 he said that maybe, you know, Quiwonkpa came, and he didn't,  
10 so, see, so when the war come the people wouldn't succeed so  
11 they didn't take it to be, you know, and that's serious.

12 well, when Taylor enter Liberia, as I said before,  
13 I'm a Krahn man, all right, I said I'm a Krahn man, I'm from  
14 Tuzuon. I was, I was living SKD complex. When the rebel  
15 came, they enter the complex, I mean they around the complex  
16 there, they arrested me because people point at, you know, at  
17 my house, they said this is, a Krahn man live around here,

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18 and I was arrested. The man that came first was a Mano man,  
19 and a commander, they call his name but I don't know, either  
20 Cooper, I don't know, Cooper or so. And when they arrested  
21 me, they tied me but, you know, the man that I, Mr. Flomo,  
22 he's the area, you know, in the whole area, so he wondered  
23 who arrested me. He call the, he call the civilian around to  
24 appeal to the rebel that this man is not a bad man. So they  
25 say, okay, but what you say, old man. So he went around, you

7

1 know, asked the people in the community, and they collected,  
2 there were \$500, Liberian dollars, they give it to Cooper.  
3 when Cooper told me, say, okay, the man should go, and let  
4 him go, but leave the area is what he told me. within that  
5 time the mean commander came, I don't know his name, he's a  
6 Gio man. And when he told, he said bring that, that damn  
7 Krahn man was there, bring him here.

8 So my, my nephew, my children, my wife, they were all  
9 there, and then I decided to escape. But then before I could  
10 escape, my nephew, they call Washington Zeon, he came and  
11 say, he went straight to the man, the commander, like he was  
12 appealing, crying. And right before him, right before me  
13 they shot him dead, you see, and I, I couldn't do anything.  
14 My children were quiet, my wife, the whole community, the  
15 people were surprised.

16 So I, I entered the house and jumped through the  
17 window. So when I was running and then there was, well, they  
18 saw me running, and they say, well, yeah, they asked --  
19 excuse me for a minute -- yeah, they asked who went there,  
20 and they start shooting at me, behind me, and I kept running.  
21 But the house is not far from the bush so I ran in the bush.

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22 But then before I could get to the, I mean, approach the  
23 bush, see, they shot me on my arm. You see, this is the mark  
24 here (indicating). Because I was trying to look behind to  
25 see the position so that at least I will know how to

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1 maneuver. The bullet entered my arm and entered here, you  
2 know, (indicating), and the bullet stuck here and this whole,  
3 I was bleeding throughout. Then I ran, I slept in the bush,  
4 then I ran, I went to BTC, who was one who took the bullet  
5 out from this arm (indicating).

6 So when I, after a certain time when Doe went to  
7 Freeport -- because I was sick, I couldn't do anything, my  
8 children were hungry, you know, and so I went, the people  
9 came all the way to Matali, so I went and asked my brother,  
10 Amos Zeon, he was a captain in the SSS, too, I ask him, I  
11 say, please, give me your truck so that I can go and move our  
12 things a little closer because the rebel, you know, taking  
13 over Matali. And he told me, he say, well, if you take the  
14 truck, you got to bring it back faster, but what happen, when  
15 he say that? well, we need to go somewhere. I say where?  
16 He didn't answer me. I took the truck, I went to Matali, I  
17 brought my things.

18 Later when I carry the truck back to the mansion, I  
19 was told that they went to Freeport, you know, and, and that  
20 was it. I didn't see him until now. So I, when this  
21 happened, I was confused. And then I decided to, you know,  
22 leave Liberia. Well, how do I leave Liberia? I can't go  
23 across Taylor land, I can't go across Prince Johnson land  
24 because Prince Johnson took over Freeport. I couldn't go, I  
25 couldn't do anything. So one day I just said, well, I have

1 to leave. Then I decided to go to the port to appeal to  
2 ECOMOG so that my family and myself can leave.

3 when I got, when I went across the bridge, I went  
4 past the remains of the new bridge. When I got there, one of  
5 my friends, I can still remember, Samuel Bakla, he worked for  
6 SSS, too, but he jumped Prince Johnson later. I saw him.  
7 But then he was, he was armed, so I was afraid. But when I  
8 passed, before I could make an attempt to look back, I was on  
9 the ground, they knocked me down, they start beating me  
10 again. See, I was crying when the ECOMOG man came with his  
11 Jeep. He came and he stopped the Jeep, and he came, because  
12 people were coming around to see what's going on. So when he  
13 came, he stopped the car, he say what's, what's happening?  
14 He's a Ghanian man. He say what's going on? when he came  
15 they were beating me. So he told the fellow, he gave warning  
16 shot, you know, and the people left. So when he came, he  
17 asked me, he say, "What's your name?" I say, "I'm Mr. Zeon."  
18 He say, "You are from what tribe?" I say, "Krahn tribe." He  
19 say, "Well, then, why are you even being here?" So I say,  
20 "Well, I want to leave. I want to leave the country with my  
21 family." So he say, "Okay. Is that why you're here?" I  
22 say, "Yeah." He say, "Okay. Where are you from?" I say,  
23 "I'm from the barracks." Because, I mean, I have no home  
24 again. I need to leave this country. He say, "Okay. I'm  
25 taking you back to the barrack. Go and pack your things, get

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1 your family prepared. I will come back with the truck and  
2 take you so that you can leave the country." So he put me in  
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3 the Jeep and took me to the barrack. When I got there, I  
4 told my family, we're packing our things. In the night he  
5 brought his truck and he put me on the truck, my children and  
6 myself, and he took us to the port. And then he give us  
7 Farina and started to say you guys can go, get on the ship.  
8 That's how I left the country.

9 And what I want to say here is that we, what I went  
10 through, through the war, you know, I felt it too bad until,  
11 you know, up to this time I don't know actually if, if there  
12 is anybody that can really stand, I mean, for the Liberian  
13 people to really unite, because what I went through, what I  
14 know that people went through this, I mean during the war, we  
15 really need to come together as Liberians, you know, to  
16 resolve this problem.

17 As I said before, I'm an ex-Special Security  
18 personnel, I'm not a politician. And so the Commissioners  
19 here, what I want for you guys, what I want to, you know,  
20 recommend or suggest to every one of you here is that the  
21 Liberians are still all over the world, I mean in Ghana, in  
22 Guinea, Ivory Coast and all this stuff. People are still  
23 facing problems, the Liberian people are still facing  
24 problems, and what I want to say here or recommend here is  
25 that I want for you guys to appeal to the UN so that they can

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1 reopen Liberian focus, because there are some people that  
2 don't want to go back now.

3 Number two, what I want for you guys to do is this  
4 lady who is now the president of Liberia, you know, from the  
5 beginning of the war she was not, you know, like a neutral  
6 person. This lady make a comment that Charles Taylor should

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7 level Monrovia, she is going to rebuild it. That statement  
8 alone, I know that she's not neutral. Okay. Now she's the  
9 president. So what the Liberian people need now is to come  
10 together so that we can reunite. We are peace-loving people,  
11 you know. But this lady need to appoint, you know, elders,  
12 most especially from Nimba County, from Grand Gedeh, you  
13 know, to help the reconciliation process, you know, and the  
14 people should go from village to village or town to town to  
15 preach reconciliation.

16 But if you, if they sit down in Monrovia and say,  
17 well, this is the commission, and people go from here and  
18 there and they don't do any -- involve Krahn man in it,  
19 involve Gio man in it, you know. Let the people go from town  
20 to town and tell the Liberian people that we need to be  
21 reunited. We are peace-loving people. Why -- I mean,  
22 Charles Taylor is gone already, he's not there, even though  
23 he brought, he brought a war but he's not there again. What  
24 next we should do? The next step is to appeal to whosoever,  
25 you know, is fighting the war, to forget our past so that we

12

1 can rebuild our country.

2 And what I want to say here again is that Prince  
3 Johnson, Prince Johnson, you know, he was a rebel leader,  
4 Prince Johnson was a rebel leader. And now to me it looks  
5 very ugly for Prince Johnson to be in the Liberian government  
6 as a, as a, he should have, as a member who has voice in the  
7 Liberian government is ugly. If, if the people want peace,  
8 Prince -- I know that the people voted him to take that  
9 position, I know that Nimba County want him in there. I'm  
10 not against it. But it is not right that a man who killed

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11 thousands and thousands of Liberians and then he's now in the  
12 center of the house, it's very ugly, you know.

13 I mean we should reason, as Liberian people we should  
14 come to our senses and say, look, this is not right. This is  
15 right, this is wrong. Together we can, we can rebuild our  
16 country. You know, we know that you guys are asking this man  
17 a question. I mean, what I, what I, what I talk about when I  
18 say now what it is, it is really Liberian to decide. Not  
19 American people. We are not American. Even though it's true  
20 that the, the Americo-Liberian from here, they established  
21 Liberia, but before they could go there, we were there  
22 before. So why can't we solve our problems? Let us reunite  
23 people.

24 I'm a Krahn man, but right now if I go back home, I  
25 mean, I have a lot of Gio friends. I mean it happened, I

13

1 mean that's past. We all have to forget. Even though it's  
2 hard, but we have to do it for the sake of our country.

3 So I just want to thank you for coming here, you  
4 know, and the process, you know, I really like the, I really  
5 appreciate the process, you guys. If, if you know that, if  
6 someone come and express himself how upset, you take that  
7 into consideration and then you compile a report. I mean we  
8 will be one coming together again. And we want to go back  
9 home. But I can't go back home now when that woman is there.  
10 She's not ready yet for peace, you know.

11 So I want to thank you again, and I'm available any  
12 time. If you people call upon me, I will come here to  
13 testify or do what is in the, the right, what I feel is in  
14 the right of the Liberian people, I will come and voice it

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15 out. So I just want to say thanks, and I'm hoping for any  
16 questions or so.

17 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Thank you very much,  
18 Mr. Zeon, for your testimony and all the information you've  
19 given us.

20 THE WITNESS: Yes.

21 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: We also want to extend  
22 to you sympathy for the loss of your relatives, two of them;  
23 one at the Freeport and the other who was shot in your  
24 presence. Will you give us their names?

25 THE WITNESS: Yes. My nephew that was shot before

14

1 me is called Washington Zeon.

2 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: What was his age?

3 THE WITNESS: He was 14 then, I guess.

4 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Okay.

5 THE WITNESS: And my brother that went to the port  
6 with President Doe is called Major Amos Zeon.

7 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Major?

8 THE WITNESS: Yep.

9 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: SSS or AFS?

10 THE WITNESS: SSS.

11 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: His age, if you  
12 remember?

13 THE WITNESS: Hmm?

14 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Can you tell us his age,  
15 if you know?

16 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.

17 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: He was older than you?

18 THE WITNESS: Yes.

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19 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: At least five years?  
20 THE WITNESS: More than five years.  
21 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Ten?  
22 THE WITNESS: I guess, about ten, about ten or so.  
23 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Just about ten years  
24 older than you. Okay. A few gaps. Let's fill them before  
25 Commissioners can ask questions. You joined the SSS in 1981?

15

1 THE WITNESS: '81, I joined. I, I was not SSS  
2 personnel. I was a cadet at that time.  
3 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: You joined the SSS as a  
4 cadet?  
5 THE WITNESS: Yeah.  
6 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: 1981.  
7 THE WITNESS: When I applied, I was in school when  
8 I applied as a cadet.  
9 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: And you remained after  
10 the outbreak of the conflict?  
11 THE WITNESS: Yeah.  
12 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Until you left in 2000?  
13 THE WITNESS: Yeah.  
14 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Okay. Where were you  
15 when the rebels first captured you? Did you say SKD Stadium  
16 or SKD Boulevard?  
17 THE WITNESS: I lived around SKD Stadium.  
18 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: You lived around SKD  
19 Stadium.  
20 THE WITNESS: Yeah.  
21 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: At the time you were a  
22 personnel of the SSS?

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23 THE WITNESS: Sure.

24 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: And you remained until  
25 the rebels came and captured you?

16

1 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

2 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Okay. Then you took  
3 your brother's truck to move your things. Did you say from  
4 SKD to Matali?

5 THE WITNESS: No. This is what happened. When  
6 the war came, we move, my brother and myself, he was living  
7 Matali. So when this war came, I went and took fastest -- we  
8 have three brothers. I move faster, left and I move his  
9 things from, from where he live to Matali. You understand  
10 what I'm saying? And so I have, I have the other brother  
11 things with Major Zeon in the house at Matali.

12 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: So all of you moved to  
13 Matali?

14 THE WITNESS: Yeah, so when, when this happened,  
15 when I went to BTC, my wife and the children, they went to  
16 Matali to my brother's house, the oldest brother's house.

17 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: So you got a truck and  
18 you went to Matali--

19 THE WITNESS: I went to Matali.

20 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: -- took all your things.  
21 You took it to the mansion or to BTC?

22 THE WITNESS: No. BTC.

23 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Took all your things to  
24 BTC.

25 THE WITNESS: Yes, I was moving the things to BTC.

17

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1 And I went, I went in the morning to get a truck from him,  
2 and I moved some things to BTC. I was leaving home.

3 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Okay. What was your  
4 rank?

5 THE WITNESS: My what?

6 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Your rank.

7 THE WITNESS: My rank? Oh. I was a second,  
8 second lieutenant at the time.

9 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Thank you very much.  
10 Sheikh?

11 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: Thank you,  
12 Mr. Zeon, for your testimony. From your statement we gather  
13 that from, that by 1980 you were mature person who have had  
14 some knowledge and experience about the government attitude  
15 towards the citizens before 1980 coup, and after 1980 coup  
16 you were also a part of the government now when you became a  
17 cadet and then agent, and you remained there until the  
18 outbreak of the war. In your view, can you tell us what  
19 precipitated the war? What caused the war? If you can.

20 THE WITNESS: Well, what I think that brought  
21 about the war is hatred. Hatred.

22 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: Can you  
23 elaborate?

24 THE WITNESS: Yeah, hatred. And beside that,  
25 people want to re -- you know, to reach out, to come back and

18

1 retaliate, because Taylor -- when Doe took over, Taylor, I  
2 mean Doe appointed Taylor as GSA director. Taylor fled the

3 country. I think the <sup>Alfred Zeon</sup> Liberians, or most of the people here  
4 know that Taylor took some money and he fled the country.  
5 So, and the propaganda used was that Doe is, is not educated,  
6 he cannot handle the government, you know, the government is  
7 corrupt and stuff. So the only people they will use was  
8 Taylor and -- I mean Taylor, Taylor is a Congo man. You  
9 sitting there, you know that Taylor is a Congo man. So  
10 Taylor went there with the intention of, I mean to, to unseat  
11 the, the Doe government because of what happened in 1980.

12 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: Before you  
13 started your statement, you were given an oath to tell out  
14 what is true.

15 THE WITNESS: Yes.

16 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: And nothing  
17 but truth.

18 THE WITNESS: Um-hum.

19 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: with that  
20 oath, your testimony should be beyond tribal, factional, and  
21 sectional notions.

22 THE WITNESS: Okay.

23 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: You have  
24 talked about Taylor, you have talked about Johnson.

25 THE WITNESS: Um-hum.

□

19

1 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: Can you tell  
2 us what was the cause of that dramatic change, of the slogan  
3 of 1980, when it was generally welcome by all Liberians --

4 THE WITNESS: Um-hum.

5 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: -- the coup,  
6 and all of a sudden people became disgruntled to the extent



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7 that many attempted coups were staged in the ten years of the  
8 Doe government as compared to less than five attempted coups  
9 in the 133 years' domination of the previous power. What  
10 brought this change? What degenerated that government into  
11 ethnicity and all the things? Can you, because you were SSS,  
12 closer to the office of the presidency, and you were  
13 interacting with people, as the result of this you even got  
14 the information of the attempted invasion before it happened;  
15 what can you say under the oath?

16 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Okay. Thank you, sir.  
17 When Doe took over, you know, the Liberian people were happy.  
18 Quiwonkpa, Doe, Pennue, and what have you, they all adjourn  
19 and unseated the Tolbert government. Okay. Now what, what  
20 actually happened in Liberia is that when Doe took over, as  
21 we all know, that Doe took over and he became president  
22 because he was the only high-ranking officer at the time,  
23 master sergeant. Doe didn't -- I will tell you now, I will  
24 tell you truth, and nothing but the truth. Doe said that he  
25 didn't know that he was going to be president, okay? when

20

1 Quiwonkpa then took over, when Doe then took over, they took  
2 Doe, they said Doe should come and be the president. He was  
3 confused. He didn't know what to do at the time. Okay. But  
4 because he was the master sergeant at the time, so Doe  
5 accepted that. President. He accepted the position. Okay.  
6 When Doe took over, then that he's not that experienced, he  
7 brought, he brought people, even the lady that is, that is  
8 president today, I think some of them working in the  
9 government, brought in people to help him. Instead of  
10 helping Doe, they started to undermine his government. You

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11 understand what I'm saying? They started to undermine his  
12 government.

13           what does Doe know about economics? what does Doe  
14 know about, you know, setting on a budget for the country?  
15 He doesn't know. That is why he brought people closer to him  
16 to help him. But instead of helping Doe so that we can  
17 rebuild our country, they started undermining him. Okay.  
18 And so what happened here is that people, when they started  
19 undermining him and he started to, you know, like to say,  
20 well, if you are not doing your job, give this person a  
21 chance, you know, people started going against Doe. And  
22 besides that, Doe -- at the time, Quiwonkpa was then  
23 commanding general. When Doe and Quiwonkpa got into that  
24 conflict, when Doe told Quiwonkpa, he say, look, well, I want  
25 you to leave the barrack. Go and be the secretary general at

21

1 the capital building. Quiwonkpa refused. Because with the  
2 power of the Army people behind him, he know he had the voice  
3 to do anything. So Doe said, no, I'm going to release you  
4 from the barrack because I don't know, I don't know where you  
5 stand. According to information I am getting, things are  
6 going on that I'm hearing, they are not, you know, I mean,  
7 they are very discouraging. So, please, we are, you know,  
8 stage a coup and were successful. So please go back, I mean  
9 I want to transfer you to the capital barrack. Let somebody  
10 else take over the Army as a commanding general. And he  
11 refused, because he know that he has, you know, the support  
12 of the Army people at the time, because as the commanding  
13 general you have that, that power. So this is where the  
14 confusion came from, because people started using Quiwonkpa

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15 against Doe.

16 Now tell me if you are a president and someone  
17 threaten your life and they didn't succeed, then what do you  
18 do? Do you call the president and say, well, thank you for,  
19 for, for making an attempt? So, I mean, this is why people  
20 talk about coup, coup, coup in Liberia, and I don't really  
21 support the idea of coup, coup, coup, coup to Doe, because  
22 Doe didn't know his left from right, that's why he brought  
23 people, and the people betray him. So Doe was holding here  
24 and there, grabbing here and there, to see that we, that we  
25 build our country, but he didn't have that support, and so he

22

1 had to fight all at home, and that's what happened today.

2 Now when Doe went -- if you, if you, if you stage a  
3 coup, or if you plan to overthrow Doe and you are not  
4 successful, what do you -- you got security on the ground, so  
5 what they do next?

6 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Taylor's.

7 THE WITNESS: What? Say what?

8 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: I say Taylor's.

9 THE WITNESS: Oh, okay.

10 (Laughter.)

11 THE WITNESS: What, what happened here is that  
12 before Doe, before Doe take any action when there is any, he  
13 will call the elders. He will call from county to county for  
14 people to be at the executive mansion and he will say, well,  
15 this is what this person has done, this is what this person  
16 has done, what do you want me to do, if anybody can tell me  
17 what's this here. Doe will ask, this is what this person  
18 have done, what do you want me to do? And the elders will



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23 well, as I'm sitting down here, I know that Doe is a man who  
24 is hard to understand, but equally so he has life in him. So  
25 if you threaten my life and then you say, see, what do I do

24

1 next, so then what happened? And people started going  
2 against Doe. So Doe start and Doe taking step that he think  
3 that will be simple for him. So that's what happened. And  
4 so this war that came about in Liberia, you know, it  
5 shouldn't, to me it shouldn't have been a war that will take  
6 plenty people's lives. If they wanted to, I mean, unseat  
7 Doe, it will have been done in a way that Doe will leave.  
8 Like -- excuse me, sir, let me go ahead.

9 Like what the man was saying here, the man that just  
10 left from here, that they ask Taylor to open a corridor.  
11 After that open corridor, I mean Doe and his people going to  
12 leave, but it didn't happen. Prince Johnson refused -- I  
13 mean Taylor refused. What Doe said when the war came, he say  
14 when people wanted, when Taylor said no, Doe say, okay, I  
15 won't, I -- give me this time that I leave, I want to resign,  
16 but let's, let's stop the war, and they refused. It was when  
17 Doe said, well, let the people come and do what they want to  
18 do. You understand what I'm saying?

19 And so Liberian war we caused, we, we ourselves  
20 should be blamed for the Liberian war because the hatred  
21 start there. When the people said, I mean, when Quiwonkpa  
22 said, I mean when people start putting words in Quiwonkpa  
23 ears, and different, different people that went with Doe, and  
24 that was where the division came from, you see. And so, sir,  
25 the war came because people said that Doe is not capable of

25

Alfred Zeon

1 taking care of the country.

2 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: History tells  
3 us that 17 men overthrew the True Whig Party government, and  
4 designated Samuel Kanyon Doe, then master sergeant --

5 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, I can't hear what he's  
6 talking about.

7 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: Okay.  
8 History tells us --

9 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

10 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: -- that on  
11 April 2, 1980 --

12 THE WITNESS: Um-hum.

13 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: -- 17 men of  
14 Armed Forces of Liberia --

15 THE WITNESS: Yes.

16 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: -- staged a  
17 military coup --

18 THE WITNESS: Um-hum.

19 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: -- that  
20 dethrone the True Whig government.

21 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

22 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: And among  
23 these 17 men, Doe was the highest ranking order.

24 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

25 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: And for this

□

26

1 they declare a Redemption Council, People's Redemption  
2 Council, and he was made the chairman, not the president.

3 THE WITNESS: Sure.

Alfred Zeon

4 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: The chairman  
5 of this council.

6 THE WITNESS: Okay.

7 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: And by that  
8 connotation, he chairs the meeting of the council, supervised  
9 its operation. Now in your statement, you're saying that he  
10 was the president, and he was the one that people was after  
11 him, he was the one who called people and they betray him.  
12 If at all there was any coup, was it going to be the council  
13 against the council or against Samuel Kanyon Doe?

14 THE WITNESS: If there was any coup staged at the  
15 time?

16 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: Yeah, at the  
17 time.

18 THE WITNESS: It was going, because the, the  
19 people in the council, they themself wanted to stage, so it  
20 going to be against Doe.

21 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: So it was the  
22 people within the council that wanted to stage the coup --

23 THE WITNESS: Yes.

24 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: -- against  
25 him?

□

27

1 THE WITNESS: Some of the people in the council  
2 wanted to stage a coup. Like, example, Quiwonkpa.

3 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: And you said  
4 the action of executing Quiwonkpa or any other persons by Doe  
5 were mandated by the elders of Liberia?

6 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. I didn't say  
7 Quiwonkpa. I did not say Quiwonkpa. When Quiwonkpa came

Alfred Zeon

8 from Sierra Leone and enter Liberia, when the announcement  
9 was made that he, you know, they are taking over the country,  
10 when Doe was then still at the mansion, Quiwonkpa, when Doe  
11 announced that he was still at the mansion, Quiwonkpa fled  
12 and went in hiding. The people that went to get, the people  
13 that saw Quiwonkpa, when they went, they kill Quiwonkpa.  
14 When they brought Quiwonkpa at the mansion and put him right  
15 down at the grandstand, Doe came downstairs and asked a  
16 question. Why did you kill him? Why did you bring him here?  
17 You see? And he cared about, he was mad at those that kill  
18 Quiwonkpa. I'm not saying that he was supporting you; he  
19 didn't like the idea of Quiwonkpa dying. But, you see, there  
20 are orders that from people that say, well, look, do this, do  
21 this, and if you do it, that is an order. But if you don't  
22 get the order and you take an action, that mean you are  
23 undermining your, your, your commander. You understand what  
24 I'm saying? And so I didn't say the elder came together to  
25 tell Doe, say he should execute Quiwonkpa. No.

28

1 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: Or any other  
2 person for that matter?

3 THE WITNESS: Yes. The --

4 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: They didn't  
5 tell him to kill anybody?

6 THE WITNESS: They didn't say -- I say, what I'm  
7 saying, what I said is the paramounts said that if you are a  
8 leopard and deer comes to you, okay?

9 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: Who is this  
10 spokesman?

11 THE WITNESS: Say what?  
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12 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: Who was that  
13 spokesman?

14 THE WITNESS: Oh, I don't know. I don't know the  
15 elders. I don't know, I didn't know the elders at the time.  
16 I was not then at the time near Doe. Others or, let's say,  
17 civilian, or how do you call it, SSS civilian man. I'm not  
18 near Doe. I don't go around Doe.

19 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: well, how you  
20 got to know this?

21 THE WITNESS: Huh?

22 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: How you got  
23 to know this?

24 THE WITNESS: When do I get it? Yeah, but I, I  
25 got it before I get it -- - if Doe is giving speech, the

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1 security go and make, you know, and we form that security  
2 guard.

3 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: Thank you  
4 very much.

5 THE WITNESS: Okay. So I know that this is what,  
6 you know, Doe have said and this is what happened. But I  
7 don't know the elders.

8 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: Thank you.

9 THE WITNESS: I only know that this is Dwanyen or  
10 Mr. Bai Gbala or Joe Brown, I don't, I don't know them. I  
11 just know their names.

12 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: Thank you.

13 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

14 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: Mr. Zeon.

15 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

Alfred Zeon

16 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: Thank you very  
17 much for coming to tell the truth, participating in the TRC,  
18 and just, as you say, you've just told us certain things you  
19 didn't know, but I assume you heard.

20 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

21 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: You say you from  
22 Tuzuon.

23 THE WITNESS: Tuzuon.

24 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: You're a Krahn  
25 man.

□

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1 THE WITNESS: Krahn man.

2 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: Doe was from  
3 Tuzuon.

4 THE WITNESS: Krahn man.

5 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: And he was a Krahn  
6 man.

7 THE WITNESS: Sure.

8 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: Sure. 1980, the  
9 True Whig Party government was overthrown for rampant  
10 corruption, misuse of public office, nepotism, et cetera,  
11 right? You know that.

12 THE WITNESS: I don't know.

13 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: Yeah. And you  
14 continue to say there was some, like this Americo-Liberian  
15 perhaps government then. Now I saw you, you're from Tuzuon,  
16 you are, also your brother also was an SSS embassian.

17 THE WITNESS: Sure.

18 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: And most of the  
19 people who were in, around Doe, the security, what tribe were

Alfred Zeon

20 they?

21 THE WITNESS: Gio, Krahn, Bassa, Belleh, Congo,  
22 you know.

23 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: Okay. Yes. I  
24 also see from the PRC composition, the paper that we saw here  
25 yesterday, it did compose of people like Larry Borteh, who

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1 were Kru, Alfred Kollie who were from Lofa and Jeffrey Gbatu  
2 from Nimba, just to name a few. We want to say the True Whig  
3 Party government was overthrown because of those conditions,  
4 and it was time, as they say, to put an indigenous Liberian,  
5 okay? One who spoke a, who spoke a dialect. Because we've  
6 learned, and you could tell us whether it's true, that Doe's  
7 father came from Ivory Coast, because of the border between  
8 Liberia and, and --

9 THE WITNESS: Ivory Coast.

10 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: Ivory Coast.  
11 You've just under oath, whether or not Doe father came from  
12 Ivory Coast, can you tell us this fact?

13 THE WITNESS: Thank you. Yes, his great  
14 grandfather, not Doe's father. We, our great grandparents  
15 are from Ivory Coast.

16 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: Okay, thank you.  
17 Yes, you --

18 THE WITNESS: Likewise, you know, we have family  
19 in Liberia, we have family in Ivory Coast.

20 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: Okay.

21 THE WITNESS: Okay? And I think all the, the  
22 tribes that border Ivory Coast have people in Ivory Coast and  
23 in Liberia.

Alfred Zeon

24 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: Yes, Mr. Zeon,  
25 because of the matter of time, and I won't be cutting you off

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1 but, and I won't talk too much to give my other colleagues  
2 time, so the question, yes, he is from Ivory Coast.

3 THE WITNESS: Okay.

4 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: You talk about  
5 because you want explanation now that we see the situation, I  
6 want to along this Americo-Liberians, because who you  
7 consider to be Congo? In your sense, you were with SSS, and  
8 who do you consider to be Congo?

9 THE WITNESS: That's the Americo-Liberian.

10 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: The  
11 Americo-Liberians.

12 THE WITNESS: Yes.

13 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: So just like --  
14 that mean those who came from where? Americo-Liberians, who  
15 are Americo-Liberians?

16 THE WITNESS: The freed slaves from America.

17 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: The freed slaves  
18 from America.

19 THE WITNESS: Yes.

20 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: So then we seen  
21 now that those freed slaves from America who came 18 --  
22 between 1821 to 1947, we got independence, some still came up  
23 to 1870 to 1879, they were still coming. Now they have all  
24 died out. I don't know who be living from 1870 until now,  
25 over a hundred years or more in Liberia. Do you agree with

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Alfred Zeon

1 me?

2 THE WITNESS: Oh, yes.

3 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: Now just like, so  
4 there will be their descendent because they intermarried,  
5 they did, so those people who there now in Liberia are  
6 considered Liberians because they were born there under our,  
7 they acted, the Constitution of Liberia, once you're of Negro  
8 descent and born in Liberia, you're Liberian. Because if you  
9 just give the statement that Doe's father came from Ivory  
10 Coast, his great grandfather came from Ivory Coast, then his  
11 father, they, too, were descendents now of Ivory Coast and  
12 not Liberia, so that if he came and his father born him in  
13 Liberia, he's considered Liberian, you consider him Liberian  
14 and an indigenous Liberian, right?

15 THE WITNESS: Sure.

16 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: So then what do  
17 you consider those who came from America, their parents died,  
18 their mothers were born in Liberia, their grandparents were  
19 born in Liberia, they were born in Liberia, to be considered  
20 Liberians?

21 THE WITNESS: Did I say they are not Liberian?

22 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: No, I ask you, do  
23 you consider them to be Liberians?

24 THE WITNESS: Yes.

25 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: All right. Now we

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1 have the situation, the Americo-Liberians came from America  
2 in the 1800s. We have a situation now from the 1980s, from  
3 the first coup on Tolbert, to the 1990s, that Liberians from

Alfred Zeon

4 Liberia have start coming to America, and we just heard you  
5 say that you want the United Nations to still come and  
6 intervene because those who came from America now, I mean  
7 from Liberia who be considered indigenou Liberians who are  
8 now in America, to continue to remain in America because of  
9 the situation in Liberia. What do you think when they go and  
10 they are borning children here and they, those who have come  
11 here, what do you think that when they decide to go back to  
12 Liberia, well, how would they be considered;  
13 Americo-Liberians or what?

14 THE WITNESS: Thank you. I'm a Krahn man. I came  
15 here, my son is born here, he's a Krahn man. Okay? If a Gio  
16 man comes here and have his daughter or son, that person is a  
17 Gio man also. Now what happened here is that if you are born  
18 here, you are a citizen of this country. But don't forget  
19 that you are, your parents are from Liberia, okay? Now if  
20 you try to compare Americo-Liberian to what are we saying now  
21 is that people, the slaves from Africa that were brought here  
22 before, did you want to tell me that they are only from  
23 Liberia? These people are from all over, okay? They are not  
24 from Liberia alone. So if the people went back and settled  
25 in Liberia, I am not saying that they are not Liberian --

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1 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: Okay, thank you.

2 THE WITNESS: -- but we refer to them as Congo  
3 people. That what I say. I didn't say they are not  
4 Liberian.

5 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: Thank you. And  
6 for clarification today, let me tell you the difference  
7 between Americo-Liberian and Congo. Congo people, that's why

Alfred Zeon

8 you have the nickname Congo Town. The Congo people were  
9 people who never came to America. They were people who  
10 ex-slave -- I mean people who they caught for slave trade but  
11 they were captured, each vessel were captured on the boat, on  
12 the sea, high sea, and they returned them to Africa. They  
13 came from places like Congo or, and Belgium Congo and other  
14 places, and that's why you have Congo Town. So people  
15 mistake that and consider them to be Congo. But the Congo  
16 people never came to America, they never was ex-slaves.

17 Anyway, to go further, the second thing. Don't you  
18 think during that period, after 130 years, or hundred years  
19 saying of the rule of the so -- the Americo-Liberians, and  
20 people really wanted an indigenous president, leader, after  
21 having someone like Momolu Dukuly, a Mandingo who served as  
22 minister of foreign affairs, at that time they called it  
23 secretary of state, Augustus Caine, who served as minister of  
24 education, Massaquoi, who serve as ambassador, in fact, just  
25 even Jackson Doe, who was, say, vice chairman, I think he

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1 even served as education minister somewhere, yeah, education  
2 minister. We're talking about those people now. Purely  
3 indigenous. Do you think on April 12th, when they had this  
4 overthrow and wanted to establish an indigenous government,  
5 do you think it was fair to the indigenous people that  
6 Mr. Samuel Kanyon Doe was the best person to bring as  
7 president or representative of the indigenous, from the 15  
8 political subdivisions of Liberia, in your opinion, your  
9 opinion? Do you think he was the best person to bring out as  
10 an indigenous leader for the indigenous people?

11 THE WITNESS: Thank you. While it is true I'm not

12                                   Alfred Zeon  
12 forced to answer any question here --

13                   COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: Yes, you may do,  
14 yes.

15                   THE WITNESS: I may answer some questions that I  
16 think, you know, for being the best interest of our  
17 discussion. As I stated before, I said Doe, at the time he  
18 was master sergeant. Doe didn't force himself over there as  
19 the president. Okay? People that, that studied the coup,  
20 they said that because he was the higher-ranking officer at  
21 the time, you know, he should take the position.

22                   COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: Thank you very --

23                   THE WITNESS: So what I -- that question you are  
24 asking, if Peter Brown were there, if Jackson Doe were there,  
25 to go, I mean to lead the people, I mean he's educated. They

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1 going to say you come and be the president.

2                   COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: Yeah, they could  
3 say that --

4                   THE WITNESS: Okay?

5                   COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: -- but they were  
6 not saying that. I just --

7                   THE WITNESS: Yes, but the question, listen now,  
8 the question is for, if Quiwonkpa is for Doe, is for John  
9 Brown, who overthrow him is Alfred Zeon's question.

10                   COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: Okay. well,  
11 Alfred Zeon, you're setting out, you're thinking now, okay,  
12 what should be the best way follow for Liberia, but in order  
13 for us to look for the best way follow for Liberia, we have  
14 to confront our difficult past, acknowledge it to see what  
15 mistakes we made to make the lessons, so in the future,





Alfred Zeon

20 Number two, there are many facts that tell us that  
21 some of them were paid up to \$25,000 to kill Mr. Tolbert. So  
22 when you consider all these additional facts, I mean, have  
23 you gotten to know anything new that could help us to  
24 understand the root cause of that period of history?

25 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. Well, what you just

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1 stated, that some people were paid \$25,000 or so, I have no  
2 knowledge.

3 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: Okay.

4 THE WITNESS: What I do know is that Tolbert at  
5 the time arrested men like Baccus Matthew, Oscar J. Quiah,  
6 Chea Cheapoo the top, top, you know, Liberians were arrested,  
7 and at the time the people were about to get, you know, get  
8 rid of these people, because if you get rid of these people,  
9 that means we did, the indigenous Liberian wouldn't have any,  
10 like, you know, we don't have any elders or book people to be  
11 there again. So the people came together and said, well, I  
12 mean, if we sit here and this happen, that mean we are done.  
13 You see, that's how the people came about and how they  
14 organized themselves. And besides that, I was not there when  
15 they had a plan, and so I cannot give you whether, I mean,  
16 this is true or not true, I was not there.

17 what I do know, that what I will say, but because  
18 they wanted to get rid of, you know, the top brass, the  
19 native top brass, I mean, that what brought about this  
20 change.

21 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: Thank you.

22 THE WITNESS: The world can't sit down here for  
23 this to happen.

Alfred Zeon

24 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: That's very  
25 informative.

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1 THE WITNESS: And one of the reason I think, what  
2 I heard, one of the reason that it took that step.

3 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: Okay. So, thank  
4 you. That is in itself very informative, because what you're  
5 saying is that there were a higher-level echelon of leaders,  
6 maybe the progressives, et cetera, as we call in history, who  
7 felt that they were going to be eliminated --

8 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

9 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: -- and therefore  
10 they stimulated the military to serve their purpose, and that  
11 is to carry out this coup, and they must have done it with  
12 maybe financial support, et cetera. Anyway, that's a  
13 beginning. Thank you.

14 Another point. We've heard here recently, and I'm  
15 sure you may be aware of it, that the lack of our government  
16 at the times, inability to respond to a certain paperwork  
17 with regards to Mr. Taylor's extradition in America may have  
18 led to him being liberated. Now when you consider that, do  
19 you have anything you want to say about that? You understand  
20 what I'm trying to say? We just heard that this man was in  
21 jail, he should have stayed there. If he didn't get out,  
22 this whole second scenario wouldn't have happened. But it  
23 was found that our government didn't follow up on simple  
24 paperwork, which goes back to the issue of, you know,  
25 efficiency and responsible leadership, et cetera. So I don't

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Alfred Zeon

1 know if you want to say anything about that. And I'll pass  
2 on that.

3 THE WITNESS: Well, I was not here when the man  
4 was, you know, because they were interviewing me on the other  
5 side, so I didn't, I didn't get that.

6 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: Okay.

7 THE WITNESS: So what I want to say here, this is  
8 the great United States of America. We consider this country  
9 to be, you know, a hero for us. So if a man can break into  
10 jail in, I mean in America and say, well, where the people  
11 come and say this man break, I mean it's, assuming that, it's  
12 very discouraging, you see. And so I was not here when  
13 Taylor, when they sent Taylor out, when they released Taylor  
14 from jail, and I don't, I don't have any, no comment to make  
15 about. It was very -- that was not a good idea for a man who  
16 say he stole X amount of money and they say he come to  
17 America and they say he break jail. I mean it was very, very  
18 discouraging.

19 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: Okay, thank you.  
20 Another one is what would you have to say about the fact that  
21 much of this problem was linked to decisions made by the  
22 leaders at the time? For example, the decision that Doe may  
23 have made to go after the Manos and the Gios as a result of  
24 the failed coup of Quiwonkpa between 1995 and 1990 --

25 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

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1 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: -- being a root  
2 factor in the need for reaction? Because you know there's a  
3 law of nature that says every action, there's an equal and  
4 opposite reaction. Unless somebody uses a higher policy like

Alfred Zeon

5 love or forgiveness, that it's natural. So what would you  
6 have to say about that issue?

7 THE WITNESS: Well, first of all, I will say that  
8 we are all Liberians and, you know, Doe, as the president of  
9 the, I mean the head of state at the time, the decision that  
10 he took at the time may be wrong.

11 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: Okay.

12 THE WITNESS: You understand that? It is not all  
13 decision that is made by Doe that is right. Okay. But  
14 equally so, if you say Doe was going against Gio and Mano at  
15 the time then, of course, I will say something to that,  
16 because Doe didn't just go, you know, to go and attack Gio  
17 people or Mano people because he feel like. No. It was an  
18 action taken by those people first before Doe could, you  
19 know, come up with this, you know, decision. Do you  
20 understand what I'm saying?

21 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: Action/reaction,  
22 yes.

23 THE WITNESS: Yeah. So I mean he's reacting to  
24 someone as this action that, you know, he has taken before.

25 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: Okay. Thank you.

□

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1 Next one -- by the way, who was this good ECOMOG soldier that  
2 saved your life?

3 THE WITNESS: Oh, no, I'm sorry, sir, he told me  
4 not to call his name.

5 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: No problem. Okay.  
6 Next, the last one is, considering the complexity of the  
7 Liberian civil war from 1979 to 2003, then considering this  
8 natural law that I just gave you about action and reaction

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9 and how our war developed into three phases like a domino  
10 effect, you know, Doe tried to deal with the classism and the  
11 identity crisis of Liberia, staging a coup; next, Taylor now  
12 tried to deal with Doe's action, staging another coup with  
13 his people; and then next, LURD and MODEL, now trying to deal  
14 with Taylor's action, staging a third coup. So when you put  
15 all of this together and you look at TRC's mandate to look  
16 into the root cause of the crisis and recommend something,  
17 what would be your recommendation to us --

18 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

19 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: -- if you were to  
20 say the root cause is this, you know, like that?

21 THE WITNESS: Okay. See, what I want to say here  
22 is that we, we at the time, you know, were innocent about how  
23 people run government, you know, and all of these things.  
24 The root causes of this war, like Doe overthrowing is that  
25 what I get first.

□

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1 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: So you would agree  
2 with that as the root cause?

3 THE WITNESS: Yeah, like the educated people, they  
4 were trying to get rid of the educated people. Okay? Now  
5 what I believe, after Doe took over, what happened next was  
6 Taylor came back to revenge.

7 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: Cause and effect.

8 THE WITNESS: Because he felt that Doe is not  
9 capable of taking care of the country. That's number one.  
10 Number two, he felt that Doe killed Congo people. He  
11 executed 13 or, or, ex-minister or so, and one of the  
12 mistakes Doe made from the beginning, that I can tell

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13 anybody, he shouldn't have executed people at broad level  
14 like that, you know. I'm a humanist. If you execute my  
15 parent, you know, the next thing, my son is coming after you.  
16 So that was a great mistake by the PRC, then PRC government.  
17 Now how do we solve this problem?

18 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: That's the key  
19 thing.

20 THE WITNESS: Now what I said from the beginning,  
21 we should reunite as a Liberian. As I told you before, they  
22 shot me. I showed you my mark, right? But, I mean, I'm done  
23 with it. Almost 15 to -- I don't know how many years ago --  
24 I'm done with that. Where I live now, I have Gio friends.  
25 In fact, in Liberia I have Gio friends, you know? When I was

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1 in Ghana, I build my house. The people that rented in my  
2 house, they bore, that rented in my house is the man that I  
3 saw in the village that took arms. I saw him. And I told  
4 him that. He say, yes, sir. I say, okay. He lives with me  
5 in the house. And so what I'm saying here is I'm from  
6 Tuzuon, people that die from me from Tuzuon, if I stand here  
7 to count them, you wouldn't believe it. You know. But it  
8 happened. They have happened and they are past.

9 So we look, we, we supposed to come together to see  
10 how best we, the Liberian, can unite to rebuild our country.  
11 Now what I said from the beginning, that this lady, she  
12 should appoint Gio man, you give the Gio man the head of the  
13 reconciliation process, or Krahn man, but don't leave these  
14 people out and go to, to, to, and go appoint someone from  
15 Bassa or from Kru or from, let's say, Vai area. Select  
16 certain Gio people, certain Krahn people before you bring in

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17 the Bassa and the people. The conflict is between the Gio  
18 and Krahn. That I will say. I'm not disputing the fact.  
19 The conflict was between the Gio, the Mano and the Krahn. So  
20 let the people be involved first. Then the rest of the, the  
21 tribes can follow.

22 So if this woman wants peace, first of all, the  
23 statement she made from the beginning that if you level  
24 Liberia, she should apologize to the Liberian public, that's  
25 number one. Now come out and say it. I mean we need to, you

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1 know, heal our wounds. We are, we are wounded. Let the  
2 woman be the person to unite the people. But if she can't do  
3 it, and I still think that because she is a Congo lady, I  
4 mean lady, and she's part, because one lady came from  
5 Liberia, she be we are Congo people, we still rule the  
6 country. That is not what we here for, the Congo people will  
7 still rule the country. I mean it's very discouraging. We  
8 don't need these kind of people there again, you hear me.  
9 So --

10 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: Okay. In  
11 conclusion --

12 THE WITNESS: In conclusion, sir. One, I'm  
13 willing, you understand, I, Alfred K. Zeon, is willing not  
14 to, if you want, if you send, you want to send me from here  
15 to Ghana, to Ivory Coast, to Guinea, I will go. I'm not  
16 going to Liberia now. Because if, if I go to Liberia right  
17 now, there is no job. I have family, I mean, I'm not a  
18 farmer, that I will tell you. I don't know how to, to hold  
19 cutlass now, you understand what I'm saying? So if the  
20 people want for us to come back home, there should be peace



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21 there first before sending the people that fled the country.

22 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: Okay. Thank you.

23 But one point we could deal with as a reality right now.

24 Here in America, here we are over two hundred something

25 thousand maybe possible Liberians here, and amongst that

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1 group they are Krahn, they are Mandigos, they are Mano,

2 there's Gio, et cetera. So what is being done on this

3 foundation to prepare for what you're talking about, the

4 ultimate return home? Because even I see here such a small

5 turnout, even though Minnesota has the largest population of

6 Liberians.

7 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

8 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: So that's the

9 challenge I think we need to deal with first --

10 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

11 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: -- before we can

12 talk about going back home now.

13 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. This is why, when

14 the people are saying Liberian people are coming together to

15 do this, to vote to do this, vote for what? If you vote and

16 you are president, what are you, what is your contribution to

17 the Liberian people? Now you have top brass who happen to

18 have a president in this country, the Liberian community

19 here. These people should call the Liberians together, you

20 understand what I'm saying, and say, look, we have to forget,

21 I mean forget about the past. Let us come together and unite

22 as Liberians. But if you call a meeting and say, well, if

23 you go to, like Martha Sinoe, who was president for I think

24 almost, I think four years or what kind of years, what an

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25 improvement that we are getting from the people. We, we the

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1 Liberians ourselves are the problems for, I mean, for what  
2 happening back home. We are not united. If Gio man comes  
3 and becomes president, when you call a meeting and, and  
4 people will come together, that's it, what they discuss,  
5 that's it. If Krahn man become president, what they discuss,  
6 well, that's it. And we are not going anywhere. So the  
7 question you ask that, what are we doing here, that question  
8 is, it becomes, I mean you're supposed to put that question  
9 to the president of this community, Liberian community here.

10 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: Because of time, I  
11 say thank you very much and transfer it now.

12 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: Thank you,  
13 Mr. Zeon, for coming, and our sympathy for the death of your  
14 relatives.

15 THE WITNESS: Sure.

16 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: You said at one  
17 point that Doe and, during your explanation, Doe and  
18 Quiwonkpa had a problem.

19 THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am.

20 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: What was that  
21 problem?

22 THE WITNESS: The problem they had?

23 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: Um-hum.

24 THE WITNESS: Well, I said it before. I said for  
25 security reason Doe ask Quiwonkpa to leave the, the barrack.

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1 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: What was the  
2 security reason?

3 THE WITNESS: Security reason is that rumors was  
4 going around that Quiwonkpa is planning to do something.  
5 Because the, during the days, the early days of the coup, if  
6 Quiwonkpa, if you see Quiwonkpa, the amount of Army people  
7 that will be behind Quiwonkpa, you, you -- I mean, Quiwonkpa  
8 and Pennue, you understand? And Doe called Pennue and warned  
9 him that what he's doing is wrong. He called Quiwonkpa and  
10 talked to him. Quiwonkpa say, well, they are my bodyguards.  
11 So he say, well, one bodyguard, carry X amount of bodyguards.  
12 You understand what I'm saying? And so from there, you know,  
13 the tension started to, to build, and so Doe was afraid  
14 because, security reason he was afraid.

15 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: So simply because  
16 these people had X number of bodyguards behind them, he  
17 thought there was a security threat?

18 THE WITNESS: Yes. I mean he's a human being.  
19 Doe is, I mean he was then the head of state, and so if  
20 Quiwonkpa had a plan that he want to do this, he have the  
21 right to do anything that, to reshuffle his government. And  
22 so he reshuffle, and Quiwonkpa didn't, I mean, he said no.  
23 So if you, if you take me to be the president or leader of  
24 you and I tell you, I say do this and you say no, that mean I  
25 defy a directive.

□

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1 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: Okay. My second  
2 question is you said something about Doe reacting to an  
3 action by the Gio and Mano people that mean he to start to  
4 get rid of them.

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5 THE WITNESS: Yeah, what I said, what I said is, I  
6 said before Doe take any action he can call people together,  
7 so he call the elders.

8 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: No, no, not the  
9 elders. Somebody asked you a question about the killing of  
10 the Mano people, and the Mano and Gio people --

11 THE WITNESS: Um-hum.

12 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: -- and you said  
13 Doe was reacting to an action. How come he went against the  
14 Mano and the Gio people?

15 THE WITNESS: Yeah. What I said --

16 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: Quiwonkpa.

17 THE WITNESS: I said that --

18 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: Action by  
19 Quiwonkpa.

20 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I said that if at all you are,  
21 you know, you are a big man or you are, let's say a leader,  
22 and someone plan something against you, and the person didn't  
23 succeed, then what do you do next? So then he says, so he  
24 was reacting, that's what he said, so I say yes.

25 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: Okay.

□

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1 THE WITNESS: So that mean the Gio and the Mano,  
2 from the beginning the Gio, we share common border. You are  
3 from Liberia, you know. We have Nimba, Krahn in Nimba  
4 County, you see. And so what is the cause of this? You  
5 know, that's official, it's level of the people, the Gio man,  
6 the Gio man and the Krahn man, they were friends before. We  
7 share the same common border.

8 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: So, excuse me, so



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13 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: From 1981 clean  
14 down to when Doe went to the port and got killed.

15 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

16 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: Were you aware of  
17 most of the killings that were going on in the country, and  
18 did you --

19 THE WITNESS: To a point.

20 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: -- at any point  
21 did you get instruction to commit any of those?

22 THE WITNESS: To a point. From 1980 I was cadet.  
23 I was a student. You understand what I'm saying?

24 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: Um-hum.

25 THE WITNESS: So I was not SS personnel at the

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1 time until I graduated from school. Then 1984, before I went  
2 for a training, okay? So from 1981 to '84 I was not SS  
3 personnel, I was not an agent. I was just a cadet.

4 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: So from --

5 THE WITNESS: From school I go, when I go, I do  
6 the filing work, I leave. That's it.

7 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: But '84 to '90 --

8 THE WITNESS: From '84 to '90? Go from '84 to  
9 '90?

10 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: Yeah.

11 THE WITNESS: Okay. From '84 to '90, when I was  
12 an agent, as I said before, I was a plainclothes personnel.  
13 Doe had people that, at like advance training, the directors,  
14 you know, these are the people that come around closer to  
15 Doe. But if I go to work, my assignment is go on the field.  
16 You understand what I'm saying? Go on the field. So when I

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17 go and sign in, I'm going for intelligence. I am not in the  
18 mansion to, to know what kind of decision Doe is running  
19 there. I'm not Director Nelson. I'm not Director Brown.  
20 I'm not director, I'm just a single personnel.

21 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: So what did your,  
22 your duty entail?

23 THE WITNESS: My duty entailed is that if there is  
24 any information, if there's any information, like if we hear  
25 information that, you know, this person is planning such and

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1 such a thing against the government, we go there as  
2 plainclothes personnel to find out fact, whether it's true or  
3 not, and so if you come back and you submit a report, they go  
4 there and they investigate. They do counter, you know,  
5 investigation before action is taken.

6 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: Okay. Finally,  
7 were you related to Doe?

8 THE WITNESS: Yes.

9 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: And what was --

10 THE WITNESS: He was my cousin.

11 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: Your cousin?

12 THE WITNESS: Yes.

13 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: Okay. You said  
14 that a whole lot of people died from you --

15 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

16 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: -- from Tuzuon. I  
17 don't want it now. Could you please give us a list? Because  
18 at the end of our process we are supposed to have a listing  
19 of all of those who died in the war. You talk about only  
20 two, your brother, and I think your nephew.

21 Alfred Zeon  
THE WITNESS: No, my nephew died from my house.  
22 He didn't go to Freeport.  
23 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: No, I know, but  
24 they died, they died during the war.  
25 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

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1 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: Okay.  
2 THE WITNESS: So the list of people from Tuzuon?  
3 Or the list of the people that I know?  
4 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: Your relatives.  
5 THE WITNESS: Relatives?  
6 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: Oh, yeah. You say  
7 so many of them died during the war.  
8 THE WITNESS: Yeah.  
9 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: Yeah, okay. So we  
10 appreciate if you could please give her a listing of all of  
11 those.  
12 THE WITNESS: Thank you.  
13 VICE CHAIRPERSON DEDE DOLOPEI: Thank you.  
14 THE WITNESS: I will do that.  
15 COMMISSIONER MASSA WASHINGTON: Mr. Zeon, thank  
16 you very much again for coming, and from your testimony here  
17 today we can clearly see that this war produced no winners,  
18 we are all losers, and let me extend sympathy to you for your  
19 loss, the loss of your relatives and friends. I have a  
20 couple of questions, well, not a couple of questions, one or  
21 two questions.  
22 THE WITNESS: Um-hum.  
23 COMMISSIONER MASSA WASHINGTON: One or two of them  
24 are follow-up questions --



25 Alfred Zeon  
THE WITNESS: Yeah.

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1 COMMISSIONER MASSA WASHINGTON: -- because some of  
2 my colleagues asked them already. And please pardon me, the  
3 questions are not intended to, to question you or to show  
4 suspicion, but it's just that you seem to be in a unique  
5 position as a former SSS person, a member of the Krahn tribe,  
6 and also someone who is, you know, was close to the  
7 president, so I will ask certain questions just for the sake  
8 of clarification. I hope you don't mind.

9 My colleague asked the question before about Nimba  
10 citizens being killed. A follow-up question to that. In  
11 your response you stated that the late President Samuel Doe  
12 at the time didn't trust Nimba citizens because of the  
13 Quiwonkpa situation, but then also from other testimonies and  
14 from other research we've done, we gather that his, the  
15 personal physician to the president, Dr. Wongay, was from  
16 Nimba County, and that also his butler was from Nimba County.  
17 Johnny Kpor was from Nimba County, and he was a reported  
18 lawyer to President Doe. In the end, as a matter of fact, he  
19 was killed because he was, quote-unquote, too loyal to  
20 President Doe.

21 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

22 COMMISSIONER MASSA WASHINGTON: And there were  
23 other citizens from Nimba County who, you know, according to  
24 information we have received, stuck by the president even  
25 when some of his own tribesmen deserted him, of course, for

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1 fear of their lives. Chief Jerry Gornyor, who was the town  
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2 crier who blew the whistle on this whole rebel incursion, you  
3 know, is from Nimba County. My question here then is Nimba  
4 County citizens were targeted from information we have  
5 received. When the war started, they lost their jobs in  
6 government, they were, they were fired from their positions  
7 in government, and some of those who were in the Army were  
8 disarmed and a lot of them faced grave danger, some of them  
9 were killed. I'm just wondering, I know you said you were  
10 not one of those who was part of the policy-making team for  
11 President Doe, but you are in a unique position. Why was it  
12 necessary to target Nimba citizens or people of Nimba County?  
13 why?

14 THE WITNESS: Thank you. I was not AFL personnel  
15 at the time. I didn't take uniform at the time. I didn't go  
16 to the front at the time. But what I want for you to  
17 understand is that, you know, before a security man takes  
18 action, there should be information before, in order to take  
19 action, or before they go to do anything. Now as you said  
20 that people were targeting Nimba County people, the war  
21 started in Nimba. You understand what I'm saying? The war  
22 started in Nimba. I was not there. My friend, who was  
23 called Tommy Belleh, he's a Krahn man, he and myself grew up  
24 together, he was in Butuo. The very first man when the Gio  
25 people entered they killed was Tommy Belleh. They chop him,

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1 they stab him. You know, at the end of every year the Gio  
2 people, sometime they move across to have feast. And so when  
3 these people went there at the time, when the Gio people were  
4 coming in mostly at the time, they thought they were coming  
5 to have feast. You understand what I'm saying? And so that

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6 night when Tommy Belleh went to take a bath, they, they stab  
7 him to death. That's how the war started.

8 Now when the information came, they sent Army people  
9 there, you know, to find out whether it's true. When the  
10 people went, they came back, they say it's true. Now what  
11 happened is we have AFL. AFL go to the front. When they  
12 reach in any town they would say, oh, you come, you come help  
13 us, I mean, you know. People will start, they say they are  
14 welcome there. Well, they welcome them and maybe give them  
15 food, you know, if you go to the front. That is information  
16 I got from there. So, I mean, then the people who sat down,  
17 ambush come, and then the people fall in the trap, the AFL,  
18 they will fall in the trap. They did it, I think, two, three  
19 times. Like welcome the Army people, they say, well, the  
20 people come to, you know, to help us. Then they set ambush.  
21 while people eating, Army people eating, then guns start  
22 firing from, rocket guns start firing from here and there.

23 So according to the information I got, the Army  
24 people there, they didn't know, they didn't know the rebel  
25 from, you know, a civilian, because the people, they were not

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1 in uniform. So if you said that people went to Nimba and  
2 they start killing people, then I don't know how it was, I  
3 was not at the front. But this is the information that we  
4 got. They didn't know who was who.

5 COMMISSIONER MASSA WASHINGTON: Okay. You spoke  
6 of this person who was a rebel, you lived around the SKD  
7 Stadium at the time, and his name was Cooper, you said, who  
8 shot your nephew.

9 THE WITNESS: Cooper was the Mano man, he came  
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10 first.

11 COMMISSIONER MASSA WASHINGTON: Yes, and he --  
12 yeah, he arrested you and then shot your nephew.

13 THE WITNESS: No.

14 COMMISSIONER MASSA WASHINGTON: Is he the same  
15 person who killed your nephew?

16 THE WITNESS: No.

17 COMMISSIONER MASSA WASHINGTON: who killed your  
18 nephew?

19 THE WITNESS: The next commander that came is a  
20 Gio man. I don't know his name.

21 COMMISSIONER MASSA WASHINGTON: Okay.

22 THE WITNESS: But Cooper is the one that came  
23 first. He arrested me with his group. Then they, Mr. Flomo,  
24 Joseph, the man who was I'm living, they call him Joseph  
25 Flomo, he told the people, you are pleading with this Mano

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1 man to let me go. He say he's not bad man. And so when the  
2 other man came and said they should get rid of me, and my  
3 nephew was trying to, you know, to go and appeal, he started  
4 crying, you know, please leave my pa, please leave my -- no.  
5 I mean it was very-- I don't know. I don't know if that's  
6 how they kill people on the other side. I don't know. And  
7 they just shot him right before me.

8 COMMISSIONER MASSA WASHINGTON: So you don't have  
9 any information on this person who shot and killed your  
10 nephew or some of the people who were with you?

11 THE WITNESS: I don't know, I don't know, I don't  
12 know that. The only person I know at the time because I  
13 heard him, is Cooper. Cooper. That's what I remember. The

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14 the first commander, and he was a Mano man, according to  
15 people. Flomo was talking to them. He say he's a Mano man.

16 COMMISSIONER MASSA WASHINGTON: Around what time  
17 of year was this?

18 THE WITNESS: It was 19, 19, 1990 --

19 COMMISSIONER MASSA WASHINGTON: You can think  
20 about it.

21 THE WITNESS: No, it happened before Doe died.

22 COMMISSIONER MASSA WASHINGTON: Okay.

23 THE WITNESS: So that's 1990. Ah, it happened  
24 before Doe, before Doe could go to Freeport, so it was 1990.

25 COMMISSIONER MASSA WASHINGTON: Okay. My

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1 colleague asked a question about killings that were  
2 happening, that were going -- my colleague asked a question  
3 about killings that were taking place in and around Monrovia.

4 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

5 COMMISSIONER MASSA WASHINGTON: I want to, you  
6 know, reiterate a question as well. During the early '90s,  
7 when the war started, like between the period from, from  
8 January, February 1990, all the way to, up to October,  
9 November 1990, there were a lot of killings going on in  
10 Monrovia, especially in a single area, in the Congo Town  
11 area. The rebels were not there yet, the soldiers were in  
12 charge, and we are receiving information that death squads  
13 loyal to President Doe and the Army were active in those  
14 areas. A lot of people died, civilians, you know, a lot of  
15 civilians, and there were also heads popping up through  
16 different part of the city, like the three heads that pop up  
17 on Somalia Drive, of allegedly members of the Gio and Mano

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18 tribe. Now what do you know about these death squads and  
19 what do you know about some of these killings that were  
20 taking place, like the Lutheran church, the Methodist school,  
21 and can you just shed some light?

22 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much. See, when I  
23 took oath and what I'm saying here is what I, what I see and  
24 what I've seen, and what people told me is what I will say.  
25 I won't lie. When this war started in Nimba County, when the

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1 people came, when the Army people went to the front, some of  
2 them came back and say, well, it is not easy there to admit,  
3 they decided, the people decided to go against the Gio people  
4 in the Army. You understand what I'm saying? Before me,  
5 okay, before me, one of my, my best friends, he's a Gio man,  
6 he's a lieutenant. You hear me? He was living 72nd. I  
7 think all of you should know 72nd. This Gio man, we all used  
8 to be together under Colonel Tarley, Washington, or General  
9 Jalle.

10 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: Joseph Jalle.

11 THE WITNESS: Joseph Jalle. This Gio man -- I  
12 live Jacob Town, next to 72nd. They have a group of people  
13 in the camp that are, Army people that go to the front and  
14 come back, they are desperate, you see, and so this Gio man,  
15 he say, he was a lieutenant, first lieutenant, I don't know,  
16 they say John Hill or Red Hill, but it's behind Jacob Town  
17 area, that man's head was found in that area, and I cry for  
18 that man up to this time. He's a Gio man. So while it is  
19 true that, I don't know whether, you know, that the Krahn  
20 people or whosoever, but what I do know that since he's a Gio  
21 man, there is a Krahn man that killed him there. You

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22 understand what I'm saying? Because this man, he was not a  
23 very, he wasn't a bad man. We all, all played together, we  
24 do things together. As I said, I had Gio friends, you hear  
25 me? How would this man leave 72nd and he go kill his own

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1 self, I don't know, they say John Hill or Red Hill, you see?  
2 So if the people say that they are killing the Gio people, I  
3 myself, I know that it was wrong. They had no right killing  
4 that man. If the people come and he join Gio people, okay.  
5 He's an officer.

6 So I mean that's what happened. That's what I know.  
7 What I do know is I didn't take part in the war so I don't  
8 want to, I didn't take arm, you know, against anybody, so I  
9 mean I was, I mean like -- I don't know what to say.

10 COMMISSIONER MASSA WASHINGTON: My last question.  
11 You were in the barracks at one point with your family during  
12 the heat of the war just before the late President Doe went  
13 to the port and was killed there. And according to various  
14 accounts, the situation with Liberians in the barracks,  
15 including civilians, was, was awful, and also the Camp  
16 Johnson Road area. Can you just describe for us briefly what  
17 was the general situation, condition of people who were  
18 seeking refuge in the barracks and surrounding areas and how  
19 were they treated?

20 THE WITNESS: I was living in the barracks. Well,  
21 at the barracks, that was the only place that we could go at  
22 the time. They have Gio people there in the barrack. Up to  
23 this time when Taylor came, they have Gio people in the  
24 barrack. They have, you have whole lot of tribes in the  
25 barrack, you see. But what happened here is this is BTC.

1 You know BTC. Now the people came, they were almost to the  
2 mansion. Prince Johnson people who come from this way are  
3 almost getting to the bridge, so the only corridor we have  
4 from, from the bridge to the place. We came to a time that  
5 people withdrew and they came even to the fence. You  
6 understand what I'm saying? And so what happened between  
7 these people and, and what happened, what go on here, I don't  
8 know. Because, because of my arm at the time I was not well,  
9 I was in a house.

10 COMMISSIONER MASSA WASHINGTON: No, I'm actually  
11 hoping that you have given us at least a factual picture of  
12 the humanitarian situation --

13 THE WITNESS: Oh, no.

14 COMMISSIONER MASSA WASHINGTON: -- of these people  
15 who were seeking refuge in the barracks.

16 THE WITNESS: Yeah, okay. There was a whole lot  
17 of sicknesses in the barrack. This former CID, the Mandingo  
18 man, CID director.

19 COMMISSIONER GERALD COLEMAN: Bangalee Sesay.

20 THE WITNESS: Bangalee Sesay. I saw Bangalee  
21 Sesay when he died. Cholera caught him, he was like this  
22 (indicating). And so people were dying in the barrack from  
23 bullets, you know. If you are going out, you got to be  
24 careful because bullets coming to you, bullets from all over.  
25 So what I told my children is we should be indoor. But

1 actually BTC was like, you know, ghost town, because people



Alfred Zeon  
2 were, if you go here, you hear people crying, if you go here,  
3 you hear people crying.

4 COMMISSIONER MASSA WASHINGTON: So the BTC --  
5 sorry, that's my last question, just follow-up. So the  
6 grounds of the BTC then would contain mass graves of, you  
7 know, people who were dying there --

8 THE WITNESS: Sure.

9 COMMISSIONER MASSA WASHINGTON: -- and had to be  
10 buried because they couldn't come home?

11 THE WITNESS: The beach, yeah, the beach area,  
12 Like Thomas Bangow was buried right there in the beach.

13 COMMISSIONER MASSA WASHINGTON: Thank you very  
14 much.

15 COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: Thank you very  
16 much, Mr. Zeon.

17 THE WITNESS: Sure.

18 COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: And, again, as my  
19 colleagues said, please accept our sympathies for the death  
20 of your nephew and other relatives.

21 Just as a follow-up to the question my colleagues  
22 just asked. There were in Monrovia at a certain time death  
23 squads operating, a time when Monrovia was just the area in  
24 which, which was controlled by the AFL, just a small area at  
25 the time, Sinkor, Waterside and those places. That was

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1 before Prince Johnson came in and even went to Waterside. As  
2 a security man, can you say if you would know the identity of  
3 some those who were involved in the death squads? There are  
4 reports that there were a number of people, some of whom were  
5 in positions of authority, members of the death squad. Do

Alfred Zeon

6 you know anything about that? Can you say who were some of  
7 those who were involved in these death squads?

8 THE WITNESS: well, if you say death squad, then,  
9 of course, if the people, if the war is fighting and you talk  
10 about death squad, then I don't know about it. Taylor was  
11 the commander at the time. Taylor was the ranking man that  
12 people were following at the time.

13 COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: Who were some of  
14 those under his command?

15 THE WITNESS: who?

16 COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: Who were some of  
17 Taylor's top lieutenants, people who were under his command  
18 at the time?

19 THE WITNESS: Taylor --

20 COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: That would still  
21 be alive today.

22 THE WITNESS: No, I don't know. Because what I do  
23 know is Taylor, Taylor was the only man that, according to  
24 information, that rebels afraid of, so it was Taylor that  
25 was, you know, he was heading the people that was frightened,

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1 you know, and so if you talk about death squads, I was not  
2 outside and see death squad leader or so. The only time when  
3 I was in 72nd, the man I talk about, that's the only man I  
4 know about, and I don't know who did it, because it was like  
5 in the back, they carry him like from 72nd to the Bassa  
6 people area before they, they killed him. And so I don't  
7 know who did it.

8 COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: who were some of  
9 those, to the best of your knowledge, involved in the

10 Alfred Zeon  
massacre at the Lutheran church?

11 THE WITNESS: Lutheran church?

12 COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: Yeah.

13 THE WITNESS: I have no knowledge about the people  
14 that, that went to Lutheran church. But what I do heard is  
15 that, is that Taylor, Taylor, Taylor was among them. He was  
16 the leader. Now what, but as I said before, while it is true  
17 I'm a Krahn man, I'm a security man, going myself, we don't  
18 agree to that. When I hear that thing, no, I don't.

19 COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: There are reports  
20 that --

21 THE WITNESS: So.

22 COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: There were  
23 reports that the late president, Samuel Doe, was a part of  
24 the, the group that went to the Lutheran church. Did you  
25 hear anything about this? Can you confirm or deny this?

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1 THE WITNESS: You say who?

2 COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: There were  
3 reports, there are reports, stories, rumors, reports,  
4 unconfirmed, that the late President Doe was among those who  
5 carried out the massacre at the Lutheran church. Can you  
6 confirm or deny this?

7 THE WITNESS: Is that, that Doe left the mansion  
8 and went there to, to -- I have no knowledge of that.

9 COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: Now --

10 THE WITNESS: There is no, I don't think there was  
11 no reason for Doe to leave the mansion to go and do that. I  
12 have no knowledge of that.

13 COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: You told us that

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14 you're from Tuzuon.

15 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

16 COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: And during our  
17 hearings in and around the country, we did go to Grand Gedeh  
18 and have hearings, and some of the revelations that came  
19 forth is that Tuzuon, they still, talking about  
20 reconciliation, that even in Tuzuon there is a need for  
21 reconciliation because, if you recall, the late Willie P.  
22 Neebo, who was the first Minister of Lands and Mines  
23 following the coup, and when he died and was buried,  
24 according to tradition they say when a big man dies somebody  
25 has to be buried with him. And somebody who came and

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1 testified before this Commission, this body, that his first  
2 cousin, who was a security officer on duty at the home of the  
3 president, was buried alive along with Willie P. Neebo. Did  
4 you hear anything about that? Or do you know anything about  
5 that, of that rift that currently exists within Tuzuon as a  
6 result of that?

7 THE WITNESS: I heard it, but I was not in Tuzuon.  
8 This man is a Gbabo man. We have 16 different tribes,  
9 subregions. When I say Krahn, Krahn is just Krahn, but we  
10 have 16, 16 sub, you know, regions --

11 COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: Groups?

12 THE WITNESS: -- sub tribes. So this man is a  
13 Gbabo man. He is from Zle Town, he was Zle Town, Paul Town  
14 area. He was assigned, I mean with, I don't know, the police  
15 or so, I don't know, but I heard that this man got missing in  
16 Tuzuon. I heard it. But who am I? Single, lieutenant, I'm  
17 not even assigned in Tuzuon, so I don't know about it. I



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22 reconciling, between you and Krahn and then the larger  
23 Liberian nation?

24 THE WITNESS: Okay. We are trying to, to rebuild,  
25 according to what I said, we are trying to rebuild our, our

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1 country, right? The Krahn and the different sections of  
2 Krahn, when it comes to reconciliation, you know, Tuzuon  
3 people, the Gbobor people, I know that from the onset of the  
4 war people against the Gbobor people in Tuzuon, within Tuzuon  
5 itself, I know. But, one, we are trying to preach  
6 reconciliation now. To me, I think it should be on a tribal  
7 level yet, because Krahn man, at this time we are united.  
8 From the beginning of the war, as soon as people hit, when  
9 the people were hit we were united, we were together. The  
10 people were together fighting. So I don't think that the  
11 Krahn people are divided now. However, I'm not in Liberia.  
12 If this is going on, I have no knowledge. But the  
13 reconciliation process should be, you know, between, right  
14 now it should be between Gio and Krahn now, Gio, Mano and  
15 Krahn.

16 COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: Have you heard,  
17 did you hear anything about the massacre in Glaro?

18 THE WITNESS: Glaro?

19 COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: Yeah. And River  
20 Gee. It's right next door to Grand Gedeh, Glaro.

21 THE WITNESS: No, I don't know. I don't know. I  
22 don't know about that. I'm not Gedeh, so that's why I don't  
23 know.

24 COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: Okay. This was a  
25 massacre in which over 500 persons were killed.

1           My last question to you is as a refugee in America,  
2 how have you found it, what particular challenges have you  
3 faced since coming and what do you look forward to?

4           THE WITNESS: Well, to admit, while it is true  
5 this is not my country, I'm pleased being in America now,  
6 okay? what I do know is that if you are serious, you come  
7 here, you learn better and you go back home, you live better.  
8 But right now if, if things happen in this country and if you  
9 don't, you don't put yourself together, if you don't organize  
10 yourself now, it may be too late for you. But as a refugee  
11 in the country, I got here, the people gave me, they offered  
12 me a scholarship. They said I have the time to go, I mean  
13 I'm willing, they are willing to give me scholarship, like  
14 student loan and stuff. You understand what I'm saying? And  
15 so the American people here, they are not treating us bad.  
16 We know that if we learn here, that will be part of us and  
17 our ticket back home.

18           COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: How are your  
19 children coping?

20           THE WITNESS: Hmm?

21           COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: Your children,  
22 how are they coping?

23           THE WITNESS: How are they coping? Oh, they're  
24 fine. My son just graduated from Duluth University on the  
25 other side there, and the other three are in, they are in,

□

1 they are wonderful. One man is, the oldest is now doing  
2 like, how you say, mechanical engineer or so. So I'm pleased

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3 being here. And I'm not hurt, I have not been, you know,  
4 nobody have come to me to hurt my feelings here since I've  
5 been here.

6 COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: So you feel no  
7 bitterness?

8 THE WITNESS: Hmm?

9 COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: You feel no  
10 bitterness?

11 THE WITNESS: well, the bitterness I'm feeling now  
12 is maybe the bitterness should be from my own, my own  
13 Liberian people, not the American. American people have  
14 nothing to do with my, my, what happened in my country. It  
15 is myself that brought this problem. We ourselves brought the  
16 problem. So I cannot blame the people, the people who  
17 accepted me here, I can't lie and say, well, they are  
18 treating me bad. No.

19 COMMISSIONER JOHN H.T. STEWART: Thank you very  
20 much.

21 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

22 COMMISSIONER OUMU SYLLAH: Thank you very much,  
23 Mr. witness, for coming to share your experience to us, and I  
24 am so sorry for what you experienced during the conflict and  
25 the death of your relatives.

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1 In the testimony you said when the 17 men took over  
2 the PRC government, they asked former President Doe to chair,  
3 and because he didn't know better, because based on his  
4 experience, he had people around him we should consider the  
5 traditional leaders or his advisors. Would you kindly name  
6 some of the people that you knew at that time were Doe's



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7 advisors?

8 THE WITNESS: No, what I said was that when Doe  
9 took over, he didn't know that -- I said he invited Congo  
10 people, like the higher-up people that work in his  
11 government. You understand what I'm saying? So if you talk  
12 about the advisor, I ...

13 COMMISSIONER OUMU SYLLAH: Are the traditional  
14 leaders, you say, because Doe consulted people at times of  
15 decisions --

16 THE WITNESS: Oh, yeah, Doe would call people  
17 together to ask their view, you know, say this is what  
18 happened and what do you want me to do, okay? The paramount  
19 chief, the paramount chief, the clan chief, he will call  
20 these people together. So if you know one of the chiefs in  
21 your area, that person should be the one of the, the elders.  
22 So I don't know, you know, that John Brown is the paramount  
23 chief of that day. But I know my paramount chief from  
24 Tuzuon.

25 COMMISSIONER OUMU SYLLAH: So does that mean that

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1 he didn't rely on the advice of his advisors, only the  
2 paramount chiefs?

3 THE WITNESS: No, that what I'm saying, that the  
4 elders and the paramount chiefs, the elders of the nation,  
5 the chiefs, the big, big people, he called them together.  
6 That's what I'm saying. So if you say who are some of these  
7 people? I don't know them.

8 COMMISSIONER OUMU SYLLAH: In your recommendation  
9 you say it will be better for the government to appoint a Gio  
10 man and a Krahn man to help the reconciliation process, but

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11 looking at the history of our conflict and the tribes in  
12 Liberia and the impact of the war on every sector in terms of  
13 family, individual family or society, how can you -- do you  
14 have any comments? Because knowing that this war didn't  
15 affect only one, the Gio people or the Mano people, but yet  
16 every sect of Liberia was affected, how can you reconcile  
17 that?

18 THE WITNESS: well, if you listen to my  
19 recommendation, I said that they should have put Gio people  
20 or Krahn people before bringing the other tribes in is what I  
21 said, because the, the conflict was between Gio and Krahn.  
22 You understand what I'm saying? I didn't say they should  
23 leave the other tribes out. No. That's not what I said.  
24 what I'm saying is that the main people that brought about  
25 the conflict, they should head it. They should go out ahead

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1 of it, then Bassa man follow, Kru man follow, you know. But  
2 if you leave these people out and say, well, Kru man come in  
3 and head the commission, now Krahn man is deep, Gio man is  
4 deep, you understand what I'm saying? You got to put these  
5 people together first. That's what I'm saying. I'm not  
6 saying they should leave the other people out. If you are  
7 Krahn man here and this man is not Krahn man, he's done. If  
8 he is Gio people here and this person is not Gio person, that  
9 person is done. So put them together first and let them  
10 agree, let them reconcile their differences. Then, of  
11 course, they'll approve. I'm not saying that they should  
12 leave the other people out.

13 COMMISSIONER OUMU SYLLAH: Okay. Now in terms of  
14 this Diaspora, you know that the Liberians that are here,

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15 based on other experience, we heard that more often when you  
16 call tribal meetings, you see lot of people coming, post a  
17 national event, calling all Liberians in to gather to some  
18 occasion, it's difficult for people to come. How do you  
19 think, as an individual, you can overcome these differences,  
20 knowing that we all are from one country?

21 THE WITNESS: Well, what I said before, the  
22 leaders here should try to put the Liberian people, bring  
23 them together, make them understand that we are to be  
24 reunited, we are to reconcile. So what I'm saying here is  
25 that this level of the leaders, you understand what I'm

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1 saying? We have leaders in this, in this community. Let the  
2 people try to bring the Liberian people together. I am  
3 willing, you know, to reconcile but, you know, it's hard. So  
4 we need people to encourage. I'm a victim, I need someone to  
5 encourage me. That's why Gio man is a victim, Gio man needs  
6 somebody to encourage him. You understand what I'm saying?  
7 So, I mean, I will be willing to take part in any  
8 reconciliation in a meeting or process.

9 COMMISSIONER OUMU SYLLAH: And my last question  
10 would be that when the former President Doe was killed,  
11 things became difficult, you were hopeless, you decided to go  
12 across the bridge, and on your way you met a friend but then  
13 during that process you were shot. Did the friend do  
14 anything to assist or to stop the people from torturing you  
15 or from beating you then?

16 THE WITNESS: No, you misunderstood. That's not  
17 what I said.

18 COMMISSIONER OUMU SYLLAH: A classmate or so, did  
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19 you meet anybody across besides the ECOMOG soldier that you  
20 knew?

21 THE WITNESS: Well, what I said, I said this man  
22 is an SS personnel, Bakla, Samuel Bakla. I saw Bakla, but I  
23 didn't go to him because he was heavily armed, and it was not  
24 when they shot me. They shot me before I even go there. You  
25 understand what I'm saying? I only went there to find means

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1 so that my family and myself can leave the country. You  
2 understand what I'm saying? So I didn't say it was when I  
3 was shot. No. Bakla, what I said is I believed that Bakla  
4 said, Bakla told his friends that this man is a Krahn man.  
5 That's what I said. Because he's the one I saw there. But I  
6 didn't speak to him because he was in arm.

7 COMMISSIONER OUMU SYLLAH: But besides you, did  
8 you see them torturing any other person?

9 THE WITNESS: I was -- no. I was not stationed  
10 Prince Johnson side. I came from BTC to go and find means  
11 that, so that I can leave. It was within that process, you  
12 know, they started beating me and stuff. Then ECOMOG man  
13 came and then gave warning shot, then the people left me.

14 COMMISSIONER OUMU SYLLAH: Thank you for coming.

15 THE WITNESS: So that's, that's what happened.

16 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Thank you, Mr. Witness.

17 And I will ask you very, excuse me, direct questions now, and  
18 I will be happy if you can give very direct responses. I  
19 heard, but I would like you to confirm, that you were an  
20 intelligence officer?

21 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

22 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: You didn't carry arms

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23 and you didn't go to the front at any point in time?

24 THE WITNESS: During the war? I'm saying during  
25 the war, intelligence officer, as an intelligence officer you

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1 have sidearm. You don't take heavy arm. You don't take  
2 things like BAR or M-16 or so. You had your sidearm. I had  
3 my sidearm when I was security at the time.

4 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: And then you said there  
5 was intelligence reports received by the executive mansion  
6 that Charles Taylor was training and planning this war.

7 THE WITNESS: Sure.

8 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Did the intelligence  
9 review who all were collaborators or supporters of Charles  
10 Taylor?

11 THE WITNESS: Let me, let me say this. No. Let  
12 me say this. When intelligence report came, they sent people  
13 there. When these people came back they said that, yeah,  
14 it's true. But the leaders we had at the time --

15 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: I understood all of  
16 that.

17 THE WITNESS: So they said that, you know, the  
18 Quiwonkpa government overpower anybody at any time.

19 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: The intelligence --

20 THE WITNESS: So they didn't take it to be that  
21 serious.

22 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: I understand. What I  
23 wanted to know, whether besides the name Charles Taylor --

24 THE WITNESS: Um-hum.

25 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: -- the intelligence

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1 seemed to be credible because eventually the war came and we  
2 all got to know that Charles Taylor was training, whether in  
3 that intelligence report was a review in terms of who  
4 assisted Charles Taylor, who were supporting him, who were  
5 training with him. For example, was Prince Johnson's name  
6 amongst those who came up?

7 THE WITNESS: He was collecting money here.

8 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Intelligence people --

9 THE WITNESS: Yeah, intelligence people.

10 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: -- were collecting money  
11 here?

12 THE WITNESS: Yeah, people were supporting,  
13 collecting money here to, to stage a coup.

14 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: But you didn't name any  
15 of those people or --

16 THE WITNESS: I don't know, they didn't name any.  
17 If they name any names to the directors, I don't know. But  
18 the information we got is people are collecting money to  
19 stage coup.

20 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Okay. That is  
21 sufficient. The late president was your cousin?

22 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

23 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: How close were you to  
24 him? Did you see him often? Once in a year, every month?  
25 Since you were in the mansion, was it possible to sit with

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1 him and talk things over sometimes or anything like that?

2 THE WITNESS: Well, at the time I was considered

3 as a boy in the family, okay? <sup>Alfred Zeon</sup> So the only people that see  
4 Doe often, they were men like Thomas Bangow, you know, the  
5 big, big brothers like Jim Whizney. But for me, before I see  
6 Doe, if I go to work and the assignment in the lift, the  
7 elevator --

8 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: So sometimes in a  
9 year --

10 THE WITNESS: -- and I take him up, bring him  
11 down.

12 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: -- you never saw him at  
13 all?

14 THE WITNESS: That's all. When he get in the  
15 elevator, I'm not allowed to speak to him until he opened his  
16 mouth to me.

17 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: So it's possible  
18 sometimes in an entire year you didn't see him at all?

19 THE WITNESS: You say entire year? No, what you  
20 talking about? Not entire year. I'm a security personnel  
21 so, I mean, they can assign me, like if there is no manpower,  
22 they call me. If I'm at home, they will call me and say we  
23 need you to be either on the sixth floor or either on the  
24 fourth floor.

25 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Up to today's date, have

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1 you understood why President Doe went to the Freeport?

2 THE WITNESS: Up to now I have no idea. That I am  
3 still asking. Why did he leave the executive mansion? Up to  
4 now I have no idea. Up to now. I'm telling the truth and  
5 nothing but the truth. I have no idea.

6 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: You said --

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7 THE WITNESS: whether he was leaving the country  
8 or not, I don't know.

9 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: You say when the body of  
10 the late Quiwonkpa was brought to the mansion --

11 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

12 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: -- Doe was very mad at  
13 those who killed him.

14 THE WITNESS: Yes.

15 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Can you tell us who  
16 killed him?

17 THE WITNESS: The leader of the people at the time  
18 was late Thomas Pennue, Thomas Pennue was one of those, but I  
19 was not there when they brought Quiwonkpa, of course, but  
20 Thomas Pennue was there when this happened.

21 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Nobody living was  
22 involved that you know of?

23 THE WITNESS: Thomas Pennue, Elijah --

24 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Maybe Taylor?

25 THE WITNESS: Gbasai Gaye -- no. But Thomas

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1 Pennue followers at the time, or maybe Gbasai Gaye or so.  
2 But what I am saying here is the captain at the time when  
3 they kill Quiwonkpa was Thomas Pennue, and later when they  
4 brought Quiwonkpa to the mansion, while it was true I was not  
5 there, it was like I was on the scene, you understand what  
6 I'm saying? So I don't know whether it's part of Doe that  
7 killed Quiwonkpa, but Thomas Pennue was, was the captain at  
8 the time.

9 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: My memory may not be  
10 correct, but I can recollect that there was somebody on the





15 Alfred Zeon  
CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Yeah.

16 THE WITNESS: Because this man that was sitting  
17 down here, the people went to the mansion two, I think two or  
18 three different times to get Doe out in my presence. You  
19 understand what I'm saying? I was there. Because when the  
20 people were fighting and know there was no way out, you hear  
21 me, the people brought cars to the mansion to let them go.  
22 So Doe told them that, do you want me leave these people? If  
23 you want for me to leave, take these people and leave them,  
24 take them from here, and they said they cannot take  
25 everybody. They did, I think, two or three times.

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1 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: And there were 500  
2 persons Doe said should leave the country as well?  
3 THE WITNESS: More than even 500.  
4 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: More than 500?  
5 (Laughter.)  
6 THE WITNESS: More than even 500. You understand  
7 what I'm saying? And so ...  
8 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Okay, Mr. Witness.  
9 Thank you very much. We're out the time, Commissioner Bull.  
10 We can ask him --  
11 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: Yes. Just this T.  
12 Thomas Pennue, is that the same T. Harrison Pennue?  
13 THE WITNESS: No.  
14 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: That's a different  
15 Pennue?  
16 THE WITNESS: That's a different Pennue.  
17 COMMISSIONER PEARL BROWN BULL: Okay.  
18 THE WITNESS: The Pennue I'm talking about, he was

19 the third person to, <sup>Alfred Zeon</sup> third butler who got Doe out. They got  
20 three, how you call it, Jimmy Burrow was what to the late  
21 president? Butler.

22 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Butler.

23 THE WITNESS: That's the third butler, because he  
24 had three. One, two, three, four. There were four.

25 Because ...

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1 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Okay. Sheikh, very  
2 briefly.

3 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: Mr. Zeon, let  
4 me make some clarification. This Commission was never set up  
5 by Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.

6 THE WITNESS: Hmm?

7 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: This  
8 Commission was never set up by Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.

9 THE WITNESS: Um-hum.

10 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: It was set up  
11 at the outcry conference where all the world factions,  
12 political parties, civil society organizations, international  
13 communities were all present and came out with the idea.  
14 Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf came into the presidency when this  
15 Commission was already set up and the Commissioners nominated  
16 and appointed, so I don't want you to leave from here with  
17 the notion that it was Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf who have picked  
18 these people. So it was beyond her administration.

19 THE WITNESS: Okay.

20 COMMISSIONER SHEIKH KAFUMBA KONNEH: Thank you.

21 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

22 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: Is there anything you



Alfred Zeon

1 there. No. Because if she's doing that, we would not  
2 reconcile. Because information from back home that I'm  
3 hearing is very discouraging, you know, so I won't take  
4 myself and say I'm going back home now. No. So, please, let  
5 us start that process. Thank you.

6 CHAIRMAN JEROME VERDIER: I want to thank you very  
7 much for coming and sharing your experience and for the  
8 recommendations you have made. We are sorry if the  
9 impression was created by our interaction that you were made  
10 to put up defenses for the late president, but ours is an  
11 inquiry commission, and so at times we are very probing and  
12 we ask sometimes very intrusive questions, but we appreciated  
13 that you were able to answer our questions. So thank you  
14 very much, and you can leave now.

15 THE WITNESS: Thank you, too.

16 (Applause.)

17 (Session ended at 1:40 p.m.)

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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

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I, ELIZABETH J. GANGL, a Registered Professional  
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Alfred Zeon

4 Reporter, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages of  
5 typewritten material constitute an accurate verbatim  
6 stenographic record taken by me of the proceedings  
7 aforementioned before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission  
8 of Liberia, on the 12th day of June, 2008, at the time and  
9 place specified.

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14 DATED: July 2, 2008.

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